The Advanced Encryption Standard: Rijndael

Introduction

- In 1997, NIST put out a call for candidates to replace DES. Among the requirements were that the new algorithm should allow key size of 128, 192, and 256 bits, it should operate on blocks of 128 input bits, and it should work on different hardware, e.g., 8-bit (smard cards) and the 32-bit (PCs).
- In 1998, the cryptographic community was asked to comment on 15 candidate algorithms.

Introduction

- In August 1999, five finalists were chosen: MARS (from IBM)
 RC6 (from RSA Laboratories)
 Rijndael (from Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen)
 Serpent (from Anderson, Biham, and Knudsen)
 Twofish (from Schneier, Kelsey, Whiting, Wagner, Hall, and Ferguson)
- On Oct. 2, 2000, Rijndael was selected to be AES.
 - 3 main criteria: security, cost, algorithm and implementation characteristics

Description of AES

- Block length:
 - 128 bits (Nb=4)
- Key length:
 - 128 bits (Nk=4)
 - 192 bits (Nk=6)
 - 256 bits (Nk=8)
- Number of rounds N

Nr	พb = 4
N/k = 4	10
Nk = 6	12
Nk = 8	14

S _{0,0}	S _{0,1}	S _{0,2}	S _{0,3}
S _{1,0}	S _{1,1}	S _{1,2}	S _{1,3}
S _{2,0}	S _{2,1}	S _{2,2}	S _{2,3}
S _{3,0}	S _{3,1}	S _{3,2}	S _{3,3}

$k_{0,0}$	k _{0,1}	k _{0,2}	$k_{0,3}$	k _{0,4}	k _{0,5}	$k_{0,6}$	$k_{0,7}$
k _{1,0}	k _{1,1}	k _{1,2}	k _{1,3}	k _{1,4}	k _{1,5}	k _{1,6}	k _{1,7}
k _{2,0}	k _{2,1}	k _{2.2}	k _{2,3}	k _{2,4}	k _{2,5}	k _{2.6}	k _{2,7}
k _{3,0}	k _{3,1}	k _{3,2}	k _{3,3}	k _{3,4}	k _{3,5}	k _{3,6}	k _{3,7}

Overview of AES:

- ADDROUNDKEY, which xors the RoundKey with State.
- For each of the first Nr-1 rounds: perform S_{UB}B_{YTES}(State), S_{HIFT}R_{OWS}(State), M_{IX}C_{OLUMN}(State), A_{DD}R_{OUND}K_{EY}.
- Final round: SUBBYTES, SHIFTROWS, ADDROUNDKEY.
- All operations in AES are byte-oriented.
 - The plaintext x consists of 16 byte, x₀,x₁,...,x₁₅.
 - Initially State is plaintext x (for 128-bit case):

S _{0,0}	S _{0,1}	S _{0,2}	S _{0,3}	
S _{1,0}	S _{1,1}	S _{1,2}	S _{1,3}	
S _{2,0}	S _{2,1}	S _{2,2}	S _{2,3}	
S _{3,0}	S _{3,1}	S _{3,2}	S _{3,3}	

x ₀	x ₄	x ₈	x ₁₂
x ₁	X 5	X 9	x ₁₃
x ₂	x ₆	X ₁₀	x ₁₄
X ₃	X ₇	x ₁₁	x ₁₅

S_{UB}B_{YTES}:

- It performs a substitution on each byte of **State** using an S-box, say π_s .
- π_s is a 16x16 array (Figure A). A byte is represented as two hexadecimal digits XY. So XY after substitution is $\pi_s(XY)$.



	Y	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	q	Δ	B	C	П	F	F
	0	63	1 7C	77	7B	F2	6B	6F	, C2	30	01	67	2B	FE	D7	AB	76
	1	CA	82	C9	7D	FA	59	47	F0	AD	D4	A2	AF	9C	A4	72	C0
	2	B7	FD	93	26	36	3F	F7	CC	34	A5	E5	F1	71	D8	31	15
-	3	04	C7	23	C3	18	96	05	9A	07	12	80	E2	EB	27	B2	75
Example	4	09	83	2C	1A	1B	6E	5A	A0	52	3B	D6	B3	29	E3	2F	84
C	5	53	D1	00	ED	20	FC	B1	5B	6A	СВ	BE	39	4A	4C	58	CF
	6	D0	EF	AA	FB	43	4D	33	85	45	F9	02	7F	50	3C	9F	A8
	7	51	A3	40	8F	92	9D	38	F5	BC	B6	DA	21	10	FF	F3	D2
	8	CD	0C	13	EC	5F	97	44	17	C4	A7	7E	3D	64	5D	19	73
	9	60	81	4F	DC	22	2A	90	88	46	EE	B8	14	DE	5E	0B	DB
	А	E0	32	3A	0A	49	06	24	5C	C2	D3	AC	62	91	95	E4	79
	В	E7	C8	37	6D	8D	D5	4E	A9	6C	56	F4	EA	65	7A	AE	08
	С	BA	78	25	2E	1C	A6	B4	C6	E8	DD	74	1F	4B	BD	8B	8A
	D	70	3E	B5	66	48	03	F6	0E	61	35	57	B9	86	C1	1D	9E
	E	E1	F8	98	11	69	D9	8E	94	9B	1E	87	E9	CE	55	28	DF
	F	8C	A1	89	0D	BF	E6	42	68	41	99	2D	0F	B0	54	BB	16

Figure A The AES S-box

 The AES S-box can be defined algebraically. The permutation π_s incorporates operations in the finite field

$$\mathbf{F}_{2^8} = \mathbf{Z}_2[x] / (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1).$$

- FIELD INV: the multiplicative inverse of a filed element
- BINARY TOFIELD: convert a byte to a field element
- FIELD TOBINARY: inverse operation

•
$$\sum_{i=0}^{7} a_i x^i$$

corresponds to the byte

■ Algorithm B: $S_{UB}B_{YTES}(a_7a_6a_5a_4a_3a_2a_1a_0)$ external Field Inv, Binary To Field, Field To Binary $z \leftarrow B_{INARY}T_0F_{ILED}(a_7a_6a_5a_4a_3a_2a_1a_0)$ if $z \neq 0$

then $z \leftarrow F_{\text{IELD}}I_{\text{NV}}(z)$

 $(a_7 a_6 a_5 a_4 a_3 a_2 a_1 a_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{F}_{\text{IELD}} \mathsf{T}_O \mathsf{B}_{\text{INARY}}(z)$

 $(c_7 c_6 c_5 c_4 c_3 c_2 c_1 c_0) \leftarrow (01100011)$

comment: In the following loop, all subscripts are to be reduced modulo 8

for $i \leftarrow 0$ to 7

do $b_i \leftarrow (a_i + a_{i+4} + a_{i+5} + a_{i+6} + a_{i+7} + c_i) \mod 2$ **return** (b₇b₆b₅b₄b₃b₂b₁b₀)

Operations in Algorithm B

- Take a byte $(a_7a_6a_5a_4a_3a_2a_1a_0)$ as $\sum_{i=0}^7 a_i x^i$ in \mathbf{F}_{2^8} • for $\sum_{i=0}^7 a_i x^i \neq 0$, Find its multiplicative inverse $\sum_{i=0}^7 d_i x^i$
- $(d_7d_6d_5d_4d_3d_2d_1d_0) \longrightarrow (a_7a_6a_5a_4a_3a_2a_1a_0)$
- $\begin{bmatrix} b_{0} \\ b_{1} \\ b_{2} \\ b_{3} \\ b_{4} \\ b_{5} \\ b_{6} \\ b_{7} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} c_{0} \\ c_{1} \\ c_{2} \\ c_{3} \\ c_{4} \\ c_{5} \\ c_{6} \\ c_{7} \end{bmatrix}$

Example C: (illustrates Algorithm B)

 Suppose we begin with (hex) 53. In binary, it's 01010011, which represents the field element

 $x^{6} + x^{4} + x + 1$

The multiplicative inverse (in \mathbf{F}_{2^8}) can be shown to be $x^7 + x^6 + x^3 + x$

Thus we have

 $(a_7 a_6 a_5 a_4 a_3 a_2 a_1 a_0) = (11001010).$

$$b_0 = a_0 + a_4 + a_5 + a_6 + a_7 + c_0 \mod 2$$

= 0 + 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 1 mod 2
= 1
$$b_1 = a_1 + a_5 + a_6 + a_7 + a_0 + c_1 \mod 2$$

= 1 + 0 + 1 + 1 + 0 + 1 mod 2
= 0,

etc. The result is

 $(b_7b_6b_5b_4b_3b_2b_1b_0) = (11101101).$

which is **ED** in hex.

This computation can be checked by verifying the entry in row 5 and column 3 of Figure A.

SHIFTROWS:



- Row 0: no shift
- Row 1: shift 1
- Row 2: shift 2
- Row 3: shift 3

MIXCOLUMNS: (Algorithm D)

- It is carried out on each of the four columns of **State**.
- Each column of **State** is replaced by a new column which is formed by multiplying that column by a certain matrix of elements of the field ${\bf F}_{\!_{2^8}}$.
- FIELD MULT computes two inputs product in the field.



Algorithm D: MIXCOLUMN(C) **external** FIELD MULT, BINARY TO FIELD, FIELD TO BINARY for $i \leftarrow 0$ to 3 **do** $t_i \leftarrow B_{\text{INARY}} T_O F_{\text{IELD}}(s_{i,c})$ $u_0 \leftarrow F_{IELD}M_{ULT}(x,t_0) \oplus F_{IELD}M_{ULT}(x+1,t_1) \oplus t_2 \oplus t_3$ $u_1 \leftarrow F_{IELD}M_{ULT}(x,t_1) \oplus F_{IELD}M_{ULT}(x+1,t_2) \oplus t_3 \oplus t_0$ $u_2 \leftarrow F_{\text{IELD}} M_{\text{ULT}}(x,t_2) \oplus F_{\text{IELD}} M_{\text{ULT}}(x+1,t_3) \oplus t_0 \oplus t_1$ $u_3 \leftarrow F_{\text{IELD}} M_{\text{ULT}}(x, t_3) \oplus F_{\text{IELD}} M_{\text{ULT}}(x+1, t_0) \oplus t_1 \oplus t_2$ for $i \leftarrow 0$ to 3 **do** $s_{i,c} \leftarrow F_{IELD} T_O B_{INARY}(u_i)$

K_{EY}E_{XPANSION}: (for 10-round AES)

- 10-round, 128-bit key
- We need 11 round keys, each of 16 bytes
- Key scheduling algorithm is word-oriented (4 bytes), so a round key consists of 4 words
- The concatenation of round keys is called the expanded key, which consists of 44 words, w[0], w[1],..., w[43].
- See Algorithm E

- Notations of Algorithm E:
 - Input: 128-bit key, key[0],...,key[15]
 - Output: words, w
 - **R**_{OT}**W**_{ORD}: a cyclic shift of four bytes B_0, B_1, B_2, B_3 **R**_{OT}**W**_{ORD} (B_0, B_1, B_2, B_3) = (B_1, B_2, B_3, B_0)
 - $S_{UB}W_{ORD}$: applies the S-box to each byte

 $S_{UB}W_{ORD}(B_0, B_1, B_2, B_3) = (B_0', B_1', B_2', B_3')$

where $B_i' = S_{UB}B_{YTES}(B_i)$

RCon: an array of 10 words, RCon[1],...,RCon[10], they are constants defined at the beginning

Algorithm E: KEYEXPANSION(key)

round key 0: w[0], w[1], w[2], w[3]
round key 1: w[4], w[5], w[6], w[7]
round key10: w[40], w[41], w[42],,w[43]
-2],key[4i+3])
′ _{ORD} (temp)) ⊕RCon[i/4]

- Above are the operations need to encrypt in **AES**.
- To decrypt, we perform all operations and the key schedule in the reverse order.
- Each operation, SHIFTROWS, SUBBYTES, MIXCOLUMNS must be replaced by their inverse operations.
 - ADDROUNDKEY is its own reverse.

- Analysis of AES
 - **AES** is secure against all known attacks.
 - Various aspects of design incorporate specific features to against specific attacks.
 - **Ex1**: Finite field inversion in S-box yields linear approximation and difference distribution tables close to uniform.
 - Ex2: M_{IX}C_{OLUMNS} makes it impossible to find differential and linear attacks that involve "few" active S-boxes (wide trail strategy).