## CmdCaliper: A Semantic-Aware Command-Line Embedding Model and Dataset for Security Research

Anonymous EMNLP submission

#### Abstract

001This research addresses command-line embed-<br/>ding in cybersecurity, a field obstructed by the<br/>lack of comprehensive datasets due to privacy<br/>and regulation concerns. We propose the first<br/>dataset of similar command lines, named Cmd-<br/>Dataset, for training and unbiased evaluation.006Dataset, for training and unbiased evaluation.<br/>The training set is generated using a set of large<br/>language models (LLMs) comprising 28,520<br/>osimilar command-line pairs. Our testing dataset<br/>ot consists of 2,807 similar command-line pairs<br/>our command-line data.

012In addition, we propose a command-line em-<br/>bedding model named CmdCaliper, enabling<br/>014013bedding model named CmdCaliper, enabling<br/>the computation of semantic similarity with<br/>015014the computation of semantic similarity with<br/>command lines. Performance evaluations<br/>demonstrate that the smallest version of Cmd-<br/>017016demonstrate that the smallest version of Cmd-<br/>Caliper (30 million parameters) suppresses<br/>state-of-the-art (SOTA) sentence embedding<br/>models with ten times more parameters across<br/>various tasks (e.g., malicious command-line<br/>detection and similar command-line retrieval).

Our study explores the feasibility of data generation using LLMs in the cybersecurity domain. Furthermore, we release our proposed command-line dataset, embedding models' weights and all program codes to the public. This advancement paves the way for more effective command-line embedding for future researchers.

#### 1 Introduction

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Sentence embeddings, which map diverse sentences into a unified semantic feature space, are critical for various NLP applications such as classifier training, visualization (van der Maaten and Hinton, 2008), and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) (Lewis et al., 2020). In cybersecurity, command lines provide invaluable information for detecting malicious attacks by comparing them with known historical malicious command lines from a semantic perspective. However, the flexibility in command-line syntax and structure poses challenges for fully leveraging this information. For




Figure 1: After fine-tuning our proposed similar command-line pair dataset, CmdDataset, our proposed command-line embedding model, CmdCaliper, can effectively embed command lines based on their semantics rather than solely on appearance.

example, as shown in Fig. 1, one can still correlate the two command lines according to their outputs despite the different appearances. To achieve this, using a robust embedding model to calculate the semantic similarity of command lines is promising. However, the grammatical differences between command lines and natural language sentences hinder the direct application of sentence embedding models to command-line tasks. Furthermore, one main challenge exacerbates the difficulty of research in command-line embedding: the scarcity of datasets specifically designed for command-line embedding tasks, both for training models and for fairly evaluating the performance of different methods. 043

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To address the aforementioned challenges, this paper introduces the first comprehensive dataset, CmdDataset, which includes semantically similar pairs of command lines for both training and evaluating command-line embedding methodologies. Inspired by the successes of data synthesis by LLMs (Wang et al., 2023b,a), the similar command-line pairs in our training set are automatically generated from a set of diverse command-line seed initialized from multiple real-world sources by a total of six distinct LLMs trained on diverse datasets (§ 3.1). This facilitates a broader range of command-line generation. For the testing set of CmdDataset, to prevent training data leakage, we directly employed a totally different data source instead of synthesizing command lines by LLMs, as done in the training set. (§ 3.2)

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To the end, our training set consists of 28,520 similar command-line pairs, totaling 55,909 unique command lines, and our testing set comprises 2,807 similar command-line pairs, totaling 5,576 unique command lines. Our dataset analysis and human evaluation results (§ 5) demonstrate that our pipeline can generate highly diverse and highquality similar command-line pairs.

Based on our proposed dataset, CmdDataset, we also developed the first embedding model specialized for command-line embeddings, called Cmd-Caliper. By encouraging semantically similar samples to come closer and simultaneously increasing the distance between semantically dissimilar samples in the embedding space, CmdCaliper can embed command lines into vectors from a semantic perspective. As demonstrated in Fig. 1, even when command lines differ in appearance, CmdCaliper can still position them closely in the embedding space based on their semantic meanings.

Our evaluation results (§6) demonstrate that even the smallest version of CmdCaliper, with approximately 0.03 billion parameters, can surpass SOTA sentence embedding models with ten times more parameters (0.335 billion parameters) across various command-line specific tasks, such as malicious command-line detection, similar command-line retrieval, and command-line classification.

Our contribution is threefold. First, we propose the first dataset of similar command-line pairs named CmdDataset, which allows for training and performance evaluation. Through detailed validation of the dataset's effectiveness, we believe it is well-suited for further command-line research. Secondly, we explore the potential of using LLMs to synthesize data in the cybersecurity domain. Our experiments demonstrate that LLMs can indeed generate high-quality and diverse data. Lastly, we propose the first semantic command-line embedding model, CmdCaliper. Our evaluations reveal that a command-line-specific embedding model significantly enhances performance across various downstream tasks compared to generic sentence embedding models. We open-source the entire dataset, model weights, and all program codes under BSD License at AnonymousRepo<sup>1</sup> 117

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## 2 Related Work

### 2.1 Semantic Embedding

Early works of sentence embedding such as Word2Vec (Mikolov et al., 2013) and Glove (Pennington et al., 2014), require the training of a predefined static embedding lookup table to fuse into the embedding vector of different sentences.

Recent works leverage well-trained language models such as BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) and T5 (Raffel et al., 2020) as pre-trained models to globally embed inputs (i.e., the words of sentences) into embedding vectors while considering contextual relationships to achieve impressive downstream performance. To fine-tune such models, a contrastive learning scheme (van den Oord et al., 2018) is adopted, as demonstrated in (Gao et al., 2021; Chuang et al., 2022; Zeng et al., 2022; Neelakantan et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2022, 2023a)

In the cybersecurity domain, semantic embedding is crucial for computing semantic similarity across various data types, including logs and command lines. For log-based data, Golczynski et al. (Golczynski and Emanuello, 2021) introduced an autoencoder-based model to convert log data into embedding vectors for anomaly detection. Log2Vec (Liu et al., 2019) creates a heterogeneous graph for each log dataset and uses the random walk method with Word2Vec to embed log data. LogBert (Guo et al., 2021) leverages BERT for anomaly detection, clustering the embedding vectors of normal samples to increase the separation from abnormal samples.

For command-line based data, Ongun et al. (Ongun et al., 2021) adapted the tokenization methodology for command-line-based data and followed the Word2Vec approach to train a predefined embedding lookup table for a large amount of command-line data. Conversely, Dong et al. (Dong et al., 2023) directly adopted Word2Vec for the command-line embedding.

#### 2.2 LLMs in the Cybersecurity

In the field of cybersecurity, many researchers (Motlagh et al., 2024; Divakaran and Peddinti, 2024) have also explored leveraging

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CmdCaliper/README.md

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


Figure 2: The illustration of the pipeline for automatically generating a dataset of similar command-line pairs using the Self-Instruct algorithm with a pool of LLMs.

LLMs(OpenAI, 2023; Anthropic, 2024; Touvron et al., 2023) for malicious code generations.

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Moskal et al. (Moskal et al., 2023) use LLMs to generate executable code for agent actions, facilitating automated cyber campaigns. McKee et al. (McKee and Noever, 2023) explore using LLMs as honeypots by generating executable commands to simulate Linux, Mac, and Windows terminals. Chatzoglou et al. (Chatzoglou et al., 2023) demonstrate ChatGPT's ability to generate malicious code that can evade detection.

### 3 CmdDataset: The First Command-Line Similarity Dataset

Despite the impressive performance of existing sentence embedding models (Li et al., 2023; Gao et al., 2021; Neelakantan et al., 2022), no embedding model has been designed specifically for command lines. We believe this is due to the unavailability of a large, diversified dataset with adequate annotations for effective training and unbiased evaluation.

In this section, we primarily focus on introducing the first command-line similarity dataset, named CmdDataset. This training set comprises 28,520 pairs of command lines automatically generated by a pool of LLMs. In contrast, the testing set contains 2,807 pairs of command lines collected from real-world attack scenarios.

#### 3.1 Training Set Synthesis by LLMs

193Collecting large-scale unlabeled or small-scale an-<br/>notated command-line data is challenging due to<br/>two main factors. Firstly, labeling command-line<br/>datasets requires specialized cybersecurity knowl-<br/>edge, making it more stringent and costly than la-<br/>beling images or natural language sentences. Sec-

ondly, privacy concerns involving company or personal information in real-world command lines discourage sharing, complicating efforts to gather diverse, large-scale datasets.

The automatic data generation process known as Self-Instruct (Honovich et al., 2023; Taori et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023b) has proven effective in acquiring a comprehensive and diverse corpus of instructional data for fine-tuning LLMs. This process utilizes a powerful pre-trained large-scale language model, such as ChatGPT or Claude 3.

Our research is inspired by the substantial success of LLMs in code generation (Rozière et al., 2023; Patil et al., 2023) that exhibits similar structures to command lines and strong comprehension in the cybersecurity domain, such as malware generation (Pa et al., 2023; Botacin, 2023; Charan et al., 2023; Chatzoglou et al., 2023). Based on these capabilities, we adapt the Self-Instruct method to synthesize a substantial number of similar command-line pairs using LLMs. Our data synthesis pipeline comprises three stages: 1) Initial Seeds Collection, 2) Single Command Line Synthesis using a Pool of LLMs, and 3) Similar Command Line Synthesis, as illustrated in Fig. 2.

#### 3.1.1 Initial Seeds Collection

Incorporating randomness into prompts is crucial for enabling LLMs to synthesize diverse command lines. This is achieved using initial seeds, which consist of a diverse set of command lines. During each synthesis iteration, a subset of these seeds is sampled to construct the prompt, diversifying it and encouraging a varied output from LLMs. To ensure high-quality initial seeds, we collected 2,061 diverse Windows command lines from multiple sources (e.g., public red-team exercises and Windows commands documentation). For more details on the initial-seed collection, see Appendix B.

## 3.1.2 Single Command Line Synthesis with a Pool of LLMs

Beyond the diversity of command-line seeds, the ability of LLMs to generate sufficiently varied data is also crucial. In the original Self-Instruct pipeline (Wang et al., 2023b), GPT-3 (Brown et al., 2020) was adopted for data generation, which confines all generated data to the distribution of GPT-3's training data. We extended this method by constructing a pool of distinct LLMs to aid in data generation. This is intuitive because the distribution of training data varies among different LLMs, leading to differences in the nature of the command lines they preferentially generate. The LLM pool of our pipeline comprises the following models: Mixtral 8x7B (Jiang et al., 2024), WizardLM-13B-v1.2 (Xu et al., 2024), Gemini-1.0-Pro (Team et al., 2023), Claude-3-Haiku (Anthropic, 2024), Qwen1.5-14B-Chat (Bai et al., 2023), and GPT-3.5-Turbo (OpenAI, 2022).

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After constructing the LLM pool, we iteratively synthesize command lines by randomly sampling 12 command lines from the total command-line seeds—which include previously synthesized command lines and initial seeds—for prompt composition, as shown in Fig. 6. We then instruct a randomly selected LLM from the pool to synthesize four new command lines distinct from those in the prompt. Valid command lines are extracted from the LLM responses. Due to the randomness of generation, the LLMs may not always produce four new valid command lines. These valid new command lines are added to the total command-line seeds for the next iteration. The generation process is halted after synthesizing 28,520 command lines.

In this step, LLMs may synthesize nonexecutable command lines with minor syntax errors. However, for our dataset of similar commandline pairs, 'similar' refers to command lines sharing the same purposes or intentions, typically based on associated executable files, arguments, and argument values. Therefore, even with syntax errors, the command lines should still convey the same purpose or intention as their correct versions.

#### 3.1.3 Similar Command Line Synthesis

After collecting 28,520 command lines, we instructed GPT-4-Turbo (OpenAI, 2023) to generate a similar command line for each. The prompting template for this instruction is displayed in Fig. 7. Here, 'similar' refers to sharing the same purpose or intention, rather than merely having a similar appearance. This distinction is crucial, as in realworld scenarios, attackers may use different command lines or obfuscation techniques to achieve the same goal. We showcase several pairs of generated similar command lines in Table. 9, demonstrating the efficacy of utilizing LLMs for this purpose.

#### 3.2 Real-World Testing Set Collection

To create a testing set that can fairly and comprehensively evaluate different methods, better reflect real-world usage scenarios, and avoid training data leakage, we neither directly partitioned the training set for the testing set, nor did we use LLMs to generate entirely new command lines from the initial seeds as the training set collection pipeline. Instead, we employed Splunk Attack data (Splunk), a dataset curated from various attacks, as the source for our testing set. This allows us to evaluate various approaches in real-world scenarios, as it includes many malicious command lines corresponding to various MITRE ATT&CK (mitre) techniques, covering multiple distinct attack vectors. 299

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Initially, we extracted 12,723 unique command lines from the Splunk Attack data. However, many command lines had similar meanings but differed slightly in appearance, leading to data duplication and potential evaluation inaccuracies. To address this concern, we generated explanations using Chat-GPT and then converted these explanations into embeddings using GTE-Large (Li et al., 2023). We used these embeddings to remove command lines with semantically similar content, resulting in a final testing set of 2,807 command lines. For more details about the deduplication process, please refer to Appendix A. We then followed the similar command line synthesis step proposed in Sec. 3.1.3 to instruct GPT-4-turbo to generate the corresponding similar command line for each command line.

For each command line from the original set of 2,807, we used the explanation embeddings to identify the 1,000 least similar command lines from the remaining 2,806 as negative command lines. Additionally, we designated the generated similar command line as the positive command line. This method avoids evaluation inaccuracies by preventing the inclusion of semantically similar command lines among the negatives.

## 4 CmdCaliper: A Semantic-Aware Command-Line Embedding Model

Utilizing the proposed dataset CmdDataset, a command-line embedding model can be trained with a contrastive objective, like sentence embedding methodologies, as seen in (Gao et al., 2021; Chuang et al., 2022; Neelakantan et al., 2022). Given an embedding model, denoted as E, the procedure of embedding a command line  $c_i$  into an embedding vector  $e_i$  can be described as  $e_i = E(c_i)$ . In each training iteration, several similar pairs are randomly sampled from the training set to form a batch, which contains k similar command-line pairs  $\{(x_i, x_i^+)\}_{i=1}^k$ , where  $(x_i, x_i^+)$  represents the  $i^{\text{th}}$  similar command-line pair. Within the batch,

	Training Set	Testing Set
Num of command-line pair	28,520	2,807
Num of unique command line	55,909	5,576
Max. command-line length	3,464	7,502
Min. command-line length	3	2
Avg. command-line length	91.635	96.301
Std. of command-line length	60.794	196.675

Table 1: The statistic information of CmdDataset.

	Coverage Rate (%)
Windows Commands	73.52
Windows Common File Extensions	70.67

Table 2: Coverage rates of CmdDataset across all Windows Commands and Windows common file extensions.

the similar command line  $x_i^+$  is regarded as a positive sample of sample  $x_i$ , thereby encouraging the associated embedding vectors to be closer within the feature space. Conversely, other samples  $\{x_j^+, \forall j \in \{1, 2, ..., k\} \setminus \{i\}\}$  are treated as in-batch negatives (Sohn, 2016; Neelakantan et al., 2022; Gao et al., 2021), encouraging the embedding vectors to be farther. The InfoNCE loss (van den Oord et al., 2018), denoted as  $\mathcal{L}_{info}$ , can be calculated as follows:

$$\mathcal{L}_{info} = -\sum_{i=1}^{k} \log \frac{\exp(\frac{E(x_i) \cdot E(x_i^+)}{\tau})}{\sum_{j=1}^{k} \exp(\frac{E(x_i) \cdot E(x_j^+)}{\tau})}, \quad (1)$$

where  $\tau$  is a hyperparameter that  $\tau \in \mathbb{R}^+$ .

### 5 Evaluation on CmdDataset

#### 5.1 Experimental Settings

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In the entire CmdDataset synthesis pipeline, to enhance the diversity of the generated command lines, we follow the approach outlined in (Wang et al., 2023a) and set the temperature parameter to 1 for all LLMs to encourage more random outputs.

5.2 The Statistics of the Dataset

The statistical information for the training and testing sets of the CmdDataset is presented in Table 1. Thanks to the real-world sources of our testing set, the standard deviation of the testing data significantly differs from that of the training set, enabling a more generalized and accurate evaluation.

#### 5.3 The Diversity of the Synthesized Command Line

In this experiment, we aim to assess the diversity of these synthesized command lines. We calculated




Figure 3: The distribution of the highest ROUGE-L overlap score between the generated command lines and the initial command-line seeds.

their coverage across all Windows commands<sup>2</sup> and common file name extensions in a clean Windows 10 virtual machine, as demonstrated in Table 2. To avoid bias, we excluded our manually formulated initial seeds and focused only on the command lines generated by LLMs. Overall, our synthesized command lines achieve a coverage rate of 73.52% out of 306 unique Windows commands and 70.67% out of 75 common file extensions. For more details about the coverage rate calculation process, please refer to Appendix C.

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We conducted an in-depth analysis of the differences between the generated command lines and the initial command-line seeds, which served as a foundational starting point for constructing the command-line dataset. For each generated command line, we calculated the highest ROUGE-L overlap (Lin, 2004) which ranges from 0 to 1 among all command-line seeds. A higher ROUGE-L score indicates a greater overlap between the generated command lines and the initial commandline seeds. The distribution of ROUGE-L scores is illustrated in Fig. 3. These findings suggest that the command lines synthesized by our pipeline (Sec. 3.1) are not limited to minor tweaks of the original command-line seeds. On the contrary, they are capable of producing a broad range of command lines, some of which may exhibit significant differences from the initial seeds.

# 5.4 The Diversity within the Similar Command-Line Pairs

In this section, we examined the distribution of ROUGE-L overlap for each pair of similar command lines, as shown in Fig. 4. These metrics help determine whether similar command-line pairs are derived from minor modifications to arguments or entirely different commands achieving a similar objective. Notably, our findings reveal that most

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Windows Command-line reference A-Z




Figure 4: The distribution of ROUGE-L overlap score for all similar command-line pairs.

ROUGE-L scores are low, nearing zero, suggesting that the "similarity" in our command-line dataset is not solely based on lexical similarities but rather reflects genuine semantic similarities. This vital understanding enables us to train command-line embedding models from a semantic perspective and subsequently evaluate the performance of different command-line embedding models.

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# 5.5 The Quality of the LLM's Command-Line Explanations

In Sec. 3.2, we utilize ChatGPT (OpenAI, 2022) to generate explanations for command lines and employ GTE-Large (Li et al., 2023) to convert these explanations into embeddings for data processing. In this evaluation, our focus is on assessing the quality of the explanations generated by LLM.

We randomly selected 200 command lines and their explanations from our training set. An expert (collaborator of this work) with over three years of cybersecurity experience assessed the correctness of each explanation, providing scores as positive, neutral, or negative, while ignoring minor syntax errors. Normalizing the expert's scores against the highest possible total, we obtained a score of **98.25%**, indicating that most command-line explanations accurately describe their purposes. Several good and bad examples are listed in Table 10.

### 5.6 The Quality of the Similar Command-Line Pairs

In this experiment, we investigate whether the command-line pairs generated by LLMs are truly similar in terms of semantics. Leveraging the findings presented in Sec. 5.5, which demonstrate a high alignment between the explanations generated by LLMs and those provided by human experts, we follow the same experimental settings, utilizing identical prompts and instructing ChatGPT (OpenAI, 2022) to generate explanations for each command line in the testing set.




Figure 5: The histogram of the explanation similarity between random command-line pairs and similar command-line pairs in the testing set of CmdDataset.

LLMs for Data Synthesis	Coverage Rate (%)
GPT-3.5-Turbo (OpenAI, 2022)	48.75
Mixtral 8x7B (Jiang et al., 2024)	27.5
WizardLM-13B-v1.2 (Xu et al., 2024)	35
Gemini-1.0-Pro (Team et al., 2023)	51.25
Qwen1.5-14B-Chat (Bai et al., 2023)	23.75
Claude-3-Haiku (Anthropic, 2024)	30
LLM Pool (our)	70

Table 3: Explanation clusters coverage rates of the command lines synthesized by different LLMs.

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After acquiring all explanations, we employ GTE-Large (Li et al., 2023) to embed all explanations into corresponding embedding vectors and calculate the similarity between explanations for each similar command-line pair. Subsequently, we randomly construct an equal number of commandline pairs, totaling 2,807 pairs, with both command lines in each pair randomly sampled from all command lines in the testing set.

Fig. 5 illustrates the similarity distributions of both similar and random command-line pairs. Notably, there is a significant gap in the explanation similarity between these two groups. Specifically, the average explanation similarity of each similar command-line pair exceeds that of 97.483% of the random command-line pairs, indicating the effectiveness of synthesizing similar command lines with LLMs. Note that the range of similarity for GTE-Large is approximately between 0.65 and 1.

#### 5.7 Effectiveness of a Pool of LLMs

In this experiment, we aim to study whether a pool of LLMs can make the synthesized command lines more diverse versus utilizing a single LLM as we described in Sec. 3.1. First, we instruct each LLM in our pool to synthesize 7,500 command lines from the same initial seeds, totaling 52,500 command lines. Using findings from Sec.5.5, we then generate high-quality explanations for all synthesized

command lines. Next, we embed these explana-484 tions into vectors using GTE-Large (Li et al., 2023) 485 and cluster them with DBSCAN (Ester et al., 1996), 486 using a maximum distance of 0.08, a minimum of 487 5 samples per cluster, and cosine similarity as the 488 distance metric. This process resulted in 80 dis-489 tinct clusters (excluding the noise cluster), each 490 representing a specific purpose or intention based 491 on similar command line explanations. We then 492 computed the coverage rates of the LLM pool and 493 each individual LLM across these clusters to assess 494 495 the diversity of synthesized command lines.

> The results are presented in Table. 3. It is evident that command lines synthesized by the LLM pool cover the highest number of explanation clusters, reaching up to 70%. This highlights the capability of utilizing a pool of LLMs pre-trained on diverse training data to generate a broader range of command lines.

#### 6 Evaluation on CmdCaliper

#### 6.1 Experimental Settings

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CmdCaliper was trained on three distinct model scales: small, base, and large, which are initialized from the GTE-small, -base, and -large (Li et al., 2023), respectively. For more details about the hyperparameters and training processes, please refer to to Appendix E.

#### 6.2 Compare with SOTAs

This section compares several SOTA sentence embedding methods using the testing set from Cmd-Dataset. We adopt Mean Reciprocal Ranking@K (MRR) and Top@K metrics for evaluating the performance of CmdCaliper, following the text search task methodology (Muennighoff et al., 2022). For more details about the two evaluation metrics, please refer to Appendix D. Both metrics yield scores between 0 and 100. The results of this comparative analysis are presented in Table 8.

The results indicate that CmdCaliper consis-522 tently achieves competitive performance with stateof-the-art (SOTA) models across all evaluation met-524 rics and scales. Specifically, CmdCaliper-Base achieved an MRR@3 score of 87.56, surpassing 526 our pretrained model - GTE-Base (Li et al., 2023) by 9.36 and outperforming all sentence embed-528 ding models of comparable size. On a larger scale, 529 CmdCaliper-Large achieved an MRR@3 score of 530 89.12, surpassing GTE-Large by 4.86. Remarkably, even CmdCaliper-Small, with a mere 0.03B pa-

Methods	Params (B)	MRR @3	MRR @10	Top @3	Top @10
Levenshtein distance <sup>1</sup>	-	71.23	72.45	74.99	81.83
Word2Vec <sup>2</sup>	-	45.83	46.93	48.49	54.86
$E5_S^3$	0.03	81.59	82.6	84.97	90.59
${\rm GTE}_S{}^4$	0.03	82.35	83.28	85.39	90.84
CmdCaliper $_S$	0.03	86.81	87.78	89.21	94.76
BGE-en <sub>B</sub> <sup>5</sup>	0.11	79.49	80.41	82.33	87.39
$E5_B$	0.11	83.16	84.07	86.14	91.56
$\text{GTR}_B^6$	0.11	81.55	82.51	84.54	90.1
$GTE_B$	0.11	78.2	79.07	81.22	86.14
CmdCaliper $_B$	0.11	87.56	88.47	90.27	95.26
BGE-en <sub>L</sub>	0.34	84.11	84.92	86.64	91.09
$E5_L$	0.34	84.12	85.04	87.32	92.59
$\operatorname{GTR}_L$	0.34	88.09	88.68	91.27	94.58
$\text{GTE}_L$	0.34	84.26	85.03	87.14	91.41
CmdCaliper L	0.34	89.12	89.91	91.45	95.65
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<sup>1</sup>(Haldar and Mukhopadhyay, 2011) <sup>2</sup>(Mikolov et al., 2013) <sup>3</sup>(Wang et al., 2022) <sup>4</sup>(Li et al., 2023) <sup>5</sup>(Xiao et al., 2023) <sup>6</sup>(Ni et al., 2022)

Table 4: Comparison with the SOTAs for different pretrained language models. Subscript S, B, and L denote the Small, Base, and Large versions respectively.

Models $r (\%)$	20	40	60	80
$\operatorname{GTR}_{Base}$	0.793	0.852	0.866	0.903
$E5_{Base}$	0.796	0.859	0.87	0.899
$\text{GTE}_{Base}$	0.8	0.868	0.874	0.903
$CmdCaliper_{Base}$	0.869	0.906	0.927	0.939

Table 5: The AUC comparison for different embedding models and different sample rate r%.

rameters, is comparable with all SOTA embedding models at the large scale (with 0.335B parameters).

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## 6.3 Semantic-Based Malicious Command-Line Detection

In this section, we approach malicious command-537 line detection as a retrieval task using the open-538 source atomic-red-team dataset (Canary), which 539 includes command lines corresponding to 55 differ-540 ent MITRE ATT&CK techniques (mitre) (i.e., each 541 technique describes different command line attack 542 behaviors). We iteratively select r% of the mali-543 cious command lines from each technique as query 544 command lines, while the remaining 1 - r% serve 545 as positive command lines. Command lines from 546 other techniques act as negative command lines. 547 This process is repeated for each technique, and 548 we calculate the average area under curve (AUC). 549 The intuition behind this experiment is that a good 550 embedding model should cluster malicious com-551 mand lines from the same technique closer together, 552

Embedding Models	Params (B)	Acc. (%)
$E5_{Base}$	0.11	93.86
$GTE_{Base}$	0.11	92.8
$CmdCaliper_{Base}$	0.11	96.37

Table 6: Accuracy comparison for command-line classification fine-tuned on fixed embedding models.

as they share similar attack behaviors. For more details about the experiment setup, please refer to Appendix F.

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The detection results are illustrated in Table. 5. As observed, CmdCaliper-Base significantly outperforms all embedding models not fine-tuned on the command-line dataset. This difference is especially pronounced when the sample ratio is smaller. For instance, at a 20% sample ratio (r = 20), CmdCaliper-Base improves upon GTE-Base (Li et al., 2023) by approximately 0.069 in AUC. This suggests that when the query command-line set is smaller, the model requires a deeper understanding of the semantics of command lines.

#### 6.4 Transfer to Command-Line Classification

Fine-tuning an additional module on a pre-trained embedding model for tasks like classification or regression often outperforms training from scratch.
This is because well-trained embeddings capture rich, meaningful information that can be used across tasks. In this experiment, we trained a logistic regression classifier for Windows command classification using fixed command-line embeddings from different approaches.

Collecting a labeled command-line dataset poses significant challenges. To address this, we selected seven Windows commands: 'find', 'robocopy', 'msiexec', 'rundll32', 'sc query', 'certutil', and 'print' to synthesize 24,500 training and 24,500 testing command lines. For more details about the the classification dataset synthesis and the experimental setup, please refer to Appendix G.

The results of the classification are presented in Table. 6. As observed, CmdCaliper generally outperformed other sentence embedding models in terms of accuracy for the same model size. For example, CmdCaliper-Base achieved a 3.57% improvement over GTE-Base (Li et al., 2023). These findings highlight the importance of specialized embedding models for command-line data, allowing the models to encode more command-line information into their embedding vectors.

Model	Params	MRR	MRR	Top	Top
	(B)	@3	@10	@3	@10
Random Initialization	0.11	70.43	72.14	74.49	84.04
$Bert_{Base}$	0.11	82.25	83.38	85.79	92.13
GTE <sub>Base</sub>	0.11	<b>87.56</b>	<b>88.47</b>	<b>90.27</b>	<b>95.26</b>

Table 7: Comparison of the performance of CmdCaliper fine-tuning from the different model.

## 6.5 Does Command-Line Embedding Benefit from Sentence Embedding?

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We conducted experiments under three settings: training the Bert-Base (Devlin et al., 2019) network architecture, the pretrained model of GTE-Base (Li et al., 2023), with randomly initialized weights; fine-tuning from Bert-Base; and finetuning directly from the GTE-Base model. The results of the comparison are illustrated in Table 7. As observed, the performance of the pretrained model significantly influences the performance of the command-line embedding model. For instance, fine-tuning from the embedding model yields the highest MRR@3, showing a 5.31% improvement compared to direct fine-tuning with BERT.

We believe that the reason command-line embedding models benefit from a good sentence embedding model lies in the fact that, although command lines often have entirely different grammar and structure from general sentences, in many cases, we can still infer some partial meanings of the command lines from semantically meaningful words such as filenames, arguments, or folder names.

#### 7 Conclusion

In this work, we introduce CmdDataset, a dataset of similar command-line pairs. The training set utilizes the impressive capabilities of an LLM pool for automated generation, while the testing set consists of real-world malicious command lines for realistic evaluation. We also present CmdCaliper, the first dedicated command-line embedding model. Our results show that CmdCaliper, specifically designed for command-line processing, outperforms existing sentence embedding methods in various commandline downstream tasks, such as command classification, malicious command line detection, and similar command-line retrieval.

We open-source the dataset, model weights, and all program codes, hoping this study sheds light on future command-line embedding research.

Methods	Hidden Dim	MRR @3	MRR @10	Top @3	Top @10
BGE- $en_{Large}$ [1]	1024	84.11	84.92	86.64	91.09
$E5_{Large}$ [2]	1024	84.12	85.04	87.32	92.59
$GTE_{Large}$ [3]	1024	84.26	85.03	87.14	91.41
OpenAI-text-embedding-3-small [4]	1536	84.35	85.28	87.78	92.8
OpenAI-text-embedding-3-large	3072	89.55	90.19	92.59	96.12
CyCraft-CmdCraft	1024	89.76	90.32	92.59	95.87

Table 8: Comparison with the SOTAs for different pre-trained language models. Subscript S, B, and L denote the Small, Base, and Large versions respectively.

### 8 Limitation

Despite the contributions made in this paper, several tasks listed below are worth exploring in the future.

- Support more command-line interpreters: Given their prominence in recent cybersecurity incidents, this study focuses on Windows and PowerShell commands. Compelling statistics (Kutscher, 2023) reveal that over two-thirds of script-based attacks leverage PowerShell. Nevertheless, an investigation into a unified command-line embedding model capable of spanning multiple command-line interpreters presents a promising avenue for future research.
  - Resilience against command-line obfuscation: While CmdCaliper was trained on semantically similar command-line pairs, providing a certain degree of resilience against obfuscated command lines in this study, attackers often employ more sophisticated commandline obfuscation techniques to evade defense and detection mechanisms. This poses a significant challenge when relying solely on the embedding model for detecting malicious activities.
- Nested command line: We can obtain the corresponding semantic embedding vector by inputting a command line into CmdCaliper. However, a command line itself can be a composition of multiple command lines as well, making it difficult to accurately embed them into the feature space. Techniques such as few-shot learning (Brown et al., 2020) or instruction-finetuned text embeddings (Su et al., 2023) may provide potential solutions for generating command-line embeddings for specific downstream tasks. This area repre-

sents another possibility for future investigation. 673

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### A Testing Set Collection Detail

To deduplicate, we utilized ChatGPT (OpenAI, 2022) to transform all command lines into concise 1373 descriptions that encapsulate the purpose and in-1374 tention. Subsequently, we transformed these brief 1375 descriptions into embeddings using GTE-Large (Li 1376 et al., 2023), which achieved SOTA performance on 1377 the MTEB leaderboard (Muennighoff et al., 2022) 1378 among models of similar size. We then applied 1379 DBSCAN (Ester et al., 1996) for clustering the embeddings. Through this approach, each cluster con-1381 tains command lines with highly similar semantics 1382 based on their explanations. Finally, we extracted 1383 two command lines from each cluster, resulting in 1384 a testing set comprising 2,807 command lines in 1385 total. 1386

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#### **B** Initial-Seed Collection Detail

To gather high-quality initial seeds, we first extracted all command lines executed in DARPA Transparent Computing (DARPA, 2019), totaling 142,886 unique command lines. We then applied a heuristic filtering process to eliminate command lines that are semantically similar and differ only slightly, such as variations in log file suffixes. Ultimately, we curated 722 command lines as part of the initial seeds.

To further extend the initial seeds, we formulated 796 command lines based on the descriptions and corresponding syntax found in Windows Commands<sup>3</sup>. Additionally, we parsed all example command lines from SS64<sup>4</sup>, totaling 497 command lines, and collected an additional 46 command lines from GitHub. Together, these contributions amounted to 2,061 high-quality and diverse command lines, which were integrated to form our initial command-line seeds.

## C Windows-Commands Coverage Rate Detail

While many Windows commands are listed separately, several utilize identical executable files, like 'reg add' and 'reg copy'. To present a unified perspective, commands with shared executable were further grouped into one, resulting in 306 unique Windows commands.

For common file name extensions, we first parsed all extensions from a clean Windows 10

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Windows Command-line reference A-Z

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>SS64 Windows CMDs

- "C:\Windows\System32\bitsadmin.exe" /transfer 59697582645 /priority foreground http://example.com/example1234 "C:\Users\Public\Videos\V123456789\log32.dll" - powershell -command "Start-BitsTransfer -Source 'http://malicious.com/malicious1234' -Destination

'C:\Users\Public\Videos\V99999999\log32.dll' -Priority High"

- "cmd" /c "net use \\REMOTEDIR /user:Administrator password /persistent:no"
- python -c "import os; os.system('net use \\REMOTEDIR /user:Administrator
password /persistent:no')"

- reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall" /f "Chrome" /s

- Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\\* |
Select-Object -Property DisplayName, UninstallString | Where-Object
{\$\_.DisplayName -like '\*Chrome\*'} | Format-Table -AutoSize

- schtasks /create /tn "TaskName" /tr "C:\Path\to\program.exe" /sc daily /st 00:00 - cronich schedule daily 00:00 /path/to/program

cronjob schedule daily 00:00 /path/to/program

Table 9: The similar command-line pairs in CmdDataset. Similar command lines are not merely similar on the lexical level but also in terms of their intrinsic purpose and semantic meaning.

```
Here are 12 Windows command line examples for referencing:
1. {sampled command line seed 1}
2. {sampled command line seed 2}
12. {sampled command line seed 12}
Your job is to synthesize 4 new Windows command lines. Please adhere to the
following synthesizing guidelines:
- Ensure diverse command lines in appearance, argument value, purpose, result, and
length, particularly making sure the generated command lines differ significantly
from the reference command lines in every aspect.
Prioritize practicality in generated commands, ideally those executed or
executable. For example, please give me real argument value, filename, IP address,
and username.
- Include Windows native commands, commands from installed applications or packages
(for entertainment, work, artistic, or daily purposes), commands usually adopted
by IT, commands corresponding with mitre att&ck techniques, or even some commonly
used attack command lines. The more uncommon the command line, the better.,
```

- Do not always generate short command lines only. Be creative to synthesize all kind of command lines.

Give me your generated command lines only without any explanation or anything else. Separate each generated command line with "\n" and add a prefix "<CMD>" before each generated cmd.

Figure 6: The prompt used for generating a single command line. 12 exemplary command lines are randomly sampled from total command-line seeds for in-context demonstration.

Your task is to generate a similar Windows command line for each entry in the following command line list. In this task, 'similar' means that the command lines share the same purpose, or intention, rather than merely having a similar appearance.

Consequently, the generated command lines may differ significantly in argument values, format, and order from the original command line, or even from a different executable file, as long as they serve a similar purpose or intention. **{query command line}** 

Be creative to make the command lines appear distinctly different while adhering to the defined 'similar' criteria. For instance, you might employ obfuscation techniques, randomly rearrange the order of arguments, change the way to call the exe file, or substitute the executable file with a similar one.

Please provide only the generated similar command lines without any explanation, prefixed with "<CMD>", and separate each command line with "\n".

Figure 7: The prompt used for generating similar command lines. The query command line is randomly sampled from the total command-line seeds.

Command Line	Explanation	Labels
net use Z: \\192.168.1.1\SharedFolder /user:administrator Passw0rd!   findstr /i connected	This command line is used to map a network drive to the letter Z, connect to a shared folder on a specific IP address using administrator credentials, and then search for the keyword "connected" in the output.	Positive
schtasks /create /sc weekly /d MON,TUE,WED,THU,FRI /tn "WeeklyBackup" /tr "C:\Scripts\backup.bat" /st 18:00	This command line creates a scheduled task to run a backup script every weekday at 6:00 PM.	Positive
tasklist /fi "IMAGENAME eq notepad.exe" /fo list   find "1234"	This command line is used to list all running processes with the name "notepad.exe" and then search for a specific process ID "1234" within the list.	Positive
findstr /s /i /m "hello world" "world take care" C:\Users\* \*.pdf	Search for the phrase "hello world" in all PDF files located in the C:\Users directory and its subdirectories, ignoring case and only displaying the file names that contain the phrase.	Neutral

Table 10: Example of command lines and their corresponding explanations generated by GPT-3.5-Turbo (OpenAI, 2022). The rightmost column denotes the labels (e.g., Positive, Neutral, or Negative) assigned by the expert.

virtual machine, and removing those with special
characters and frequencies lower than 0.05%. This
process yielded a total of 75 common extensions.
We then identified how many of these extensions
are included in our training set.

## **D** Evaluation Metrics Detail

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MRR@K is a key metric in information retrieval and recommendation systems. It calculates the average reciprocal rank of the first relevant item within a list of ranked results, focusing on the top K positions. This method helps us gauge how well the most relevant item ranks among the top 10 with the highest predicted scores. The Top@K metric is similar to MRR@K but differs in that it awards a score if the ground truth is within the top K ranks, without the rank-dependent decay seen in MRR.

## E Hyperparameters and Training Process of CmdCaliper Detail

We trained CmdCaliper for 2 epochs using the Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba, 2015) with a learning rate of 0.00002 and a batch size of 64. For the temperature parameter  $\tau$  in Equation 1, we set it to 0.05. CmdCaliper was trained on three distinct model scales: small, base, and large. These models were initialized from the GTE-small (Li et al., 2023), GTE-base, and GTE-large, respectively.

We randomly selected 1,000 similar pairs from the training set to form a validation set. Evaluations on the validation set were conducted every 50 training steps. The checkpoint that demonstrated optimal performance on the validation set was then used for subsequent evaluations on the testing set.

## F Semantic-Based Malicious Command-Line Detection Detail

Initially, we define the pre-collected set of malicious command lines as the 'malicious gene pool'. Given a new command line, we leverage a command-line embedding model to obtain their embedding vectors, and compute the semantic similarity between each command line within the malicious gene pool. If one of the similarities exceeds a pre-defined threshold, we classify the new command line as malicious. This approach enables us to detect malicious command lines from a semantic perspective, even when attackers attempt to obfuscate command lines to evade pattern-based detection.

In this experiment, we utilize the open-source dataset: atomic-red-team (Canary), which encompasses a variety of command lines corresponding to numerous MITRE ATT&CK techniques (e.g., Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism or Browser Session Hijacking). The dataset consists of a set of techniques, denoted as  $\{t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_n\}$ . Within each technique  $t_i$ , we obtain a set of malicious command lines, denoted as  $\mathbb{L}_i$ , containing  $M_i$  entries:  $\mathbb{L}_i = \{c_1^i, c_2^i, \dots, c_{M_i}^i\}$ . By unioning all these malicious command line sets, we form a total command line set  $\mathbb{A}$ , which consists of 1.523 malicious command lines across various techniques, represented as  $\mathbb{A} = \bigcup_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{L}_i$ . To construct the malicious gene pool  $\mathbb{P}_i$  for each technique  $t_i$ , we select the first r% of the command lines from each technique, defined as  $\mathbb{P}_i = \{c_1^i, c_2^i, \dots, c_{\lceil \frac{r}{100} \times M_i \rceil}^i\}.$ The remaining command lines form the incoming command line set  $\mathbb{O}_i$ , denoted as:  $\mathbb{O}_i =$  $\{c^i_{\lceil \frac{r}{100} \times M_i \rceil + 1}, \dots, c^i_{M_i}\}.$ 

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For malicious gene pool construction, we exclude techniques with fewer than 9 malicious command lines, resulting in a total of 55 distinct malicious gene pools corresponding to different techniques. For the evaluation of each technique  $t_i$ , we first exclude the command lines in the malicious gene pool to form a candidate command line set  $\mathbb{C}_i$ , denoted as  $\mathbb{C}_i = \mathbb{A} \setminus \mathbb{P}_i$ . We treat the incoming command line set  $\mathbb{O}_i$  as the positive set, while the negative set  $\mathbb{G}_i$  is formed by excluding all command lines corresponding to the technique  $t_i$ , denoted as  $\mathbb{G}_i = \mathbb{A} \setminus \mathbb{L}_i$ .

Given a command line  $c_j^i$  from the candidate command line set  $\mathbb{C}_i$  and an embedding model E, the embedding vector  $e_j^i$  can be computed by  $e_j^i = E(c_j^i)$ . Subsequently, the malicious score  $s_{c_j^i}$  of the command line  $c_j^i$  for the technique  $t_i$  is determined by calculating its maximum similarity with each command line  $p_k^i$  in the malicious gene pool  $\mathbb{P}_i$ :

$$s_{c_{j}^{i}}^{i} = \max_{p_{k}^{i} \in \mathbb{P}_{i}} S(e_{j}^{i}, E(p_{k}^{i}))$$
 (2)

where  $S(\cdot)$  is the similarity function (e.g., cosine similarity function). Note that if the command line  $c_j$  belongs to the positive set  $\mathbb{O}_i$  of the technique  $t_i$ , then the malicious score should exceed the pre-defined threshold  $\tau$  for correct classification; otherwise, the score should be below the threshold if the command line is in the negative set  $\mathbb{G}_i$ .

We iteratively evaluated all 55 techniques and

1513concatenated all malicious scores to compute the1514area under the curve (AUC). This evaluation metric1515aligns with real-world application scenarios where1516a static threshold is usually applied across all tech-1517niques.

## 1518 G Classification Dataset Synthesis Detail

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These commands to synthesize the commandline classification dataset were chosen based on their ability to accept a wide range of randomly generated strings as arguments, provided that the corresponding file exists. The classifier's task is to identify the corresponding Windows command, regardless of the argument's length or complexity. For example, the command lines "find 'fewj2po3kdlewfmpemrgborktig fe34krop4k5ogjs9rkgewfefw34f'" and "find 'test'" should both be correctly categorized under the 'find' command. This highlights the importance of a robust command-line embedding model in encoding the command information within its embeddings, as it plays a crucial role in determining the purpose of each command line.

In this experiment, we used the pattern "<command> '<argument value>'" to randomly generate 7,000 command lines for each command. Of these, 3,500 were assigned to the training set and the remaining 3,500 to the testing set. The arguments for each command line were formed by concatenating seven random strings, made up of ASCII letters and digits, with lengths ranging from 1 to 20 characters, separated by spaces. To increase the difficulty of classification and simulate the obfuscation techniques that attackers might use in real-world scenarios to evade detection, we also randomly incorporated seven different commands into the argument values. For example, a synthesized command line might read: "certutil.exe 'msiexec tr9QI1L find C print oGod 5K 70kf4 2ZcVT9 rundll32 sc query mNjIL robocopy q5'", where only the first command, 'certutil', is valid.

We randomly selected 20% of the training set to serve as a validation set in the search for optimal hyperparameters. Subsequently, we utilized the obtained optimal hyperparameters to train a logistic regression classifier for performance evaluation on the testing set.